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The purpose of the present paper can be synthesized in the
following points: a) to expose the concept of the principle of
proportionality in its broadest sense and its different components
or dimensions; b) to draw the attention to an approach which is
usually not studied by authors, that is, the fact that the application
of the principle is not enough to guarantee the supremacy of the
human rights, at least in some cases; c) lastly, to point out those
requirements that could protect proportionality from the risk
mentioned in b).
I. INTRODUCTION:
THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY

AND ITS DIMENSIONS

For the last twenty years, constitutional courts have applied the
principle of proportionality as a procedure that aims to guarantee
the full respect of human rights (or fundamental rights) by the
state. This principle is applied in both civil law and common law
systems, in countries such as the United States, Argentina,
Germany, Great Britain, Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, Denmark,
Ireland, Greece, Luxemburg, Holland, Portugal, and Switzerland,
just to mention a few; and also by the European Court of Human
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Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the
European Court of Justice.1 It has been correctly said:
the parameter of rationality—a problematic restoration of the
rationabilitias in the medieval juridical culture—can be
recognized in the constitutional jurisprudence of the vast
majority of the liberal-democratic systems of our days. No
matter what its shades are, this is the question about the
“reasonable basis” of the differentiation in the doctrine of the
American Supreme Court, that of “reasonable justification”
which is put forth by the Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland; the criteria of “non arbitrariness” which,
following the thinking of Leibholz, is used by the
Constitutional Court of Germany, or the rule of
ragionevolezza, which became a general principle of law by
the ruling of the Italian Constitutional Court (sentence 81,
1963). Among us, the criteria of “reasonableness” of
normative differentiations introduced by the legislator was

1. See JÜRGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 680-702
(1992); NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN
LAW (1996); Michael Akehurst, The Application of General Principles of Law
by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
29, 38-51 (U.K.); Sophie Boyron, Proportionality in English Administrative
Law: A Faulty Translation?, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1992) (U.K);
Javier Barnes, Introducción al principio de proporcionalidad en el derecho
comparado y comunitario, 135 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA 495,
495-99 (1994) (Spain); George A. Bermann, The Principle of Proportionality,
26 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 415 (1978); Guy Braibant, Le principe de la
proportionnalité, in MÉLANGES OFFERTS À MARCEL WALINE 297 (1974); JeanMarie Auby, Le contrôle jurisdictionnel du degré de gravité d’une sanction
disciplinaire, REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE
ET À L’ÉTRANGER, janvier-fevrier 1979, at 227-238 (Fr.); JUAN FRANCISCO
LINARES, RAZONABILIDAD DE LAS LEYES (2d ed. 1989); JUAN CARLOS GAVARA
DE CARA, DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES Y DESARROLLO LEGISLATIVO 293-326
(1994); ROBERT ALEXY, TEORÍA DE LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 111-112
(2d ed. 2001); WESTEL WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929); Anna N. Georgiadou, Le principe de la
proportionnalité dans le cadre de la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice de la
Communauté Europée, 81 ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 532
(1995) (Ger.); and Javier Jiménez Campo, La igualdad jurídica como límite al
legislador, 1983 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, no. 9, at 71,
72 (Spain).
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invocated by the Constitutional Court, following, in part,
those jurisprudential orientations.2
In the common law systems, the principle is usually called
“principle of reasonableness.”3 In those places, it is possible to
find court decisions in which the principle is applied not only in
constitutional issues but also in civil law, administrative law,
criminal law, etc.
The principle of proportionality prescribes that all statutes that
affect human rights should be proportionate or reasonable. The
analysis of proportionality is made up of three sub-principles:
adequacy, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu.
The first sub-principle is that of adequacy, which establishes
that the statute which affects a human right must be suitable to
achieve the purpose that was sought by the lawmaker. That is to
say, once the interpreter has defined the end that the legislator
aimed for and the means that the legislator has designed to obtain
such end, then the interpreter must verify if the means are capable
of achieving such end.
Through the second sub-principle, the interpreter evaluates if
the lawmaker has chosen, among the means capable of obtaining
the desired end, the one which is the least restrictive of the human
2. Jiménez Campo, supra note 1, at 73. The importance of proportionality
is so big that it has been said to be “the most important general principle of the
communitarian law.” SCHWARZE, supra, at 677 (quoting Jürgen Gündisch,
Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze inder Rechtsprechung des Europäischen
Gerichtshof, in DAS WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT DES GEMEINSAMEN MARKTES IN DER
AKTUELLEN RECHTSENTWICKLUNG 97, 108 (Institut fur Integrationsforschung
ed., 1983) (Ger.)).
3. However, in some cases it is called “proportionality.” See District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2852 (U.S. 2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); Virginia v.
Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721
(2003).
The references to the idea of “reasonableness” are very common and
frequent. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). See also
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005); Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93
(2005); Illinois v. Caballes, 542 U.S. 405 (2005); United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004); Florida v. Nixon,
543 U.S. 175 (2004); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004); Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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rights. In other words, the norm will only pass the test of necessity
if it is the one among those similar in efficacy which is the least
restrictive of the rights.
Once it has been established that the norm has complied with
the first and the second sub-principles, the interpreter should
determine whether it is reasonable stricto sensu, or not. The
doctrine and the jurisprudence have defined this sub-principle as
an examination of the balance between the advantages and
disadvantages brought about by the law. “The [sub]principle of
proportionality stricto sensu means that the application of a given
instrument or means to achieve a given end or objective should not
be unreasonable in its reciprocal relationships.”4 The interpreter
must evaluate whether this balance is proportional (in other words,
reasonable), or not. In spite of this initial coincidence between the
doctrine and the jurisprudence, the dissidences in the specification
of what a “reasonable” relationship is still to come up. The
dominant position proposes that judges should weigh the
advantages and the disadvantages of the measure under analysis.
In French law, this alternative interpretation is called “balance
between costs and benefits.”5 Also, the Spanish Constitutional
Court and doctrine have reached a similar characterization.6 For
example, in STC 66/1995, the court stated that a restriction of a
right is proportional stricto sensu if it is “pondered or balanced
because more benefits or advantages for the general interest are
4. GAVARA DE CARA, supra note 1, at 308; BVerfGE 7, 377; 8, 71; 13, 97;
78, 77; y 79, 29].
5. Cf. Jeanne Lemasurier, Expropriation:”Bilan-cout-avantages” et
necessite publique, LA REVUE ADMINISTRATIVE, septembre-octobre 1979, at 502
(Fr.). See EMILIOU, supra note 1, at 67-114, 92-95; Auby, supra note 1; and
Braibant, supra note 1.
6. The proportionality stricto sensu prescribes that:
There should be a tendency to reach a balance between the advantages
and disadvantages which will inevitably appear when a right is limited, in
order to protect another right or good which is constitutionally protected.
It is necessary to carry out an evaluation in which particular and
collective interest will be confronted, which implies taking into
consideration all the relevant circumstances in the case.
MANUEL MEDINA GUERRERO, LA VINCULACIÓN NEGATIVA DEL LEGISLADOR A
LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES 132, 134 (1996) (Spain).
The author insists on this when he says that the balancing test is: “the well
adjusted relationship between the means and the ends in terms of costs and
benefits.” Id.
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derived from it than damages against other goods or values in
conflict.”7
The expression “balance between costs and benefits” seems to
indicate that any norm with a cost proportionate to its benefits will
be reasonable. Therefore, if the hypothetical benefits are high, the
way in which human rights may be affected is expected to be high
too, and this will be acceptable.8 This may be expressed with the
following formulas, using a scale from 1 to 3 to measure the
degree of restriction (3 being the most restrictive measure) and a
scale from “a” to “c” to measure the importance of the end (“a”
being the most important end):
(1) If measure 1 (M1) restricts (r) in a second degree, and it
leads to an end (E) of importance b, then it is proportional;
(2) If M2 r 3, and E c, then the measure is disproportional;
(3) If M3 r 1, then it is sufficient for E to be constitutional for
the measure to be considered proportional.
II. PROPORTIONALITY AND RESPECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The Problem
A proportional norm will be: a) adequate to the end; b) the least
restrictive of the human rights among all the adequate options that
could be applied; and, finally, c) proportional stricto sensu, that is,
it must keep the balance between the costs and the its benefits.

7. S.T.C., May 8, 1995 (S.T.C., No. 66/1995) (Spain). In Spanish:
“Ponderada o equilibrada por derivarse de ella más beneficios o ventajas para el
interés general que perjuicios sobre otros bienes o valores en conflicto.” Id.
8. Cf. GERMÁN JOSÉ BIDART CAMPOS, LA CORTE SUPREMA: EL TRIBUNAL
DE LAS GARANTÍAS CONSTITUCIONALES 107 (1984) (Arg.).
The Argentine Supreme Court has said: “the higher the hierarchy of the
protected interest, the stronger the regulation could be.” Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 27/6/1962,
“Partido Obrero (Cap. Fed.) / personería” Fallos (1962-253-154) (Arg.).
However, the principle which says that “the regulation cannot alter the
human right involved in the case, but it should go untouched and in its integrity,
without corrupting nor extinguishing it, in whole or in part.” Is still in force.
See CSJN, 5/9/1903, “Hileret y Rodríguez c. Provincia de Tucumán /
inconstitucionalidad de ley provincial del 14 de junio de 1902 y devolución de
dinero” Fallos (1903-98-20), at 24 (Arg.).
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In my opinion, and this is the thesis of the present article, this
conception of proportionality does not necessarily prevent the
legislator from violating the human rights, at least in some cases.
In other words, if the principle of proportionality were just a
balance between the “weight” of the right and that of the reasons
that have led the legislator to decide to restrict such right, then,
ultimately, that human right could lose its characteristic of
impassable barrier for the state. Indeed, the invocation of a more
or less convincing raison d’état could justify the sacrifice of some
human rights. We can find an example of this in the excesses of
the de facto governments in some Latin American countries during
the 1970s and 1980s. The consequences of this viewpoint cannot
be more disastrous for the general theory of human rights: at best,
the rights will depend on consensus; in all cases, they will never be
called victories in front of the majorities.9
The risk mentioned above can be clearly seen in the following
formula:
If M4 r 3 and if F a, then the norm would seem to be
proportional. However, M4 restricts the norm (N4) so much, that
it causes the violation of the essential content of the human right
involved.
Therefore, it would be sufficient to find an end which is
important enough and a means that can be justified by that end to
transform the principle of proportionality in a mere formal
criterion, that is, without the capacity to guarantee the supremacy
of human rights.10
B. Possible Solutions
There are two alternatives to make the principle of
proportionality more meaningful.
9. According to a well known expression, human rights are “are political
trumps held by individuals.” Thus, they cannot be altered, not even by
consensus. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
10. That has been pointed out by A. B. Bianchi, in his critique of the
Argentine case “Peralta, Luis A. y otro c. Estado Nacional.” CSJN, 27/12/1990,
“Peralta, Luis A. y otro c. Estado Nacional (Ministerio de Economía - Banco
Central de la República Argentina) / amparo” El Derecho [E.D.] (1990-141-519)
(Arg.). Cf. Alberto B. Bianchi, La Corte Suprema ha establecido su tesis oficial
sobre la emergencia económica, 1991 L.L 5, 5-6 (Arg.).
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The first one is to evaluate whether the norm respects the
principle of proportionality stricto sensu or not,11 and
subsequently, whether the essential content12 is also respected in a
given case. Those who defend this opinion should accept that it is
possible for a proportionate norm—in spite of its being so—to be
unconstitutional if it affects the essential content of a human
right.13
The second alternative completely rules this possibility out.
On the one hand, it does not seem appropriate to accept the
proportionality of a norm that violates a human right, both from a
theoretical point of view (because it would be contradictory) and
from a pragmatic point of view (as it would give place to bad
interpretations). On the other hand, the evaluation of the
proportion between costs and benefits cannot be satisfactorily done
without considering the content of the human rights involved in the
case.
Consequently, from this second perspective, a norm can only
be proportionate if it does not affect the essential content of the
involved rights. For example, this is the position held by the
Argentinean Supreme Court. For this court, the principle of
proportionality (principio de razonabilidad) is the technical
instrument it uses to apply article 28 of the Argentinean
Constitution, which prescribes that human rights cannot be
affected.14
The position of the Argentinean Supreme Court does not
transform the two steps explained in the first alternative into one.
In fact, the court admits the existence of the two steps, as the
evaluation of the proportionality of the norm is different from the
evaluation of the essential content. However, the court changes the
11. See MEDINA GUERRERO, supra note 5, at 145-165.
12. See GAVARA DE CARA, supra note 1; ANTONIO LUIS MARTÍNEZPUJALTE, LA GARANTÍA DEL CONTENIDO ESENCIAL DE LOS DERECHOS
FUNDAMENTALES (1997).
13. “No matter how difficult the task may be and, consequently, how strong
the temptation to reduce the content of the limits to the proportionality test, the
guarantee recognized by article 53.1 of the Spanish Constitution undoubtedly
demands its autonomous application as a technique aimed to control the
proportional limits.” MEDINA GUERRERO, supra note 5, at 165.
14. “The principles, guarantees, and rights recognized in the preceding
sections shall not be modified by the laws that regulate their enforcement.” Art.
28, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
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order in which it performs the evaluations. First, the tribunal must
check if the content of the right has been affected. Then, it must
examine if the norm preserves a proportional relationship between
the advantages and the cost that it produces.
Such analysis may give the following results:
(1) If measure 1 (M1) alters (a) the content of human right 1
(D1), it is disproportional;
(2) If M2 ¬ (a) D2, but r 3, and F c, it is disproportional;
(3) If M3 ¬ (a) D3, and r 2, and F to, it is proportional.
As a preliminary conclusion, we may say that the
proportionality of a measure (3) presupposes: a) that the measure
does not alter the content of the involved human rights; and b) that
the measure which does not alter the human rights restricts the
norms about human rights in an acceptable degree, taking into
account the importance of the pursued end. Then, there are two
possible types of violation of the principle of proportionality:
disproportionality due to the alteration of the human rights
involved (hypothesis 1), and disproportionality due to the lack of
justification of the restriction (hypothesis 2).
The evaluation concerning the alteration should come before
the evaluation concerning the justification because the latter
requires determining the degree in which the involved right is
being restricted. Thus, it is necessary to learn which the limits and
the characteristics of the rights are, the relationship between the
specific human rights involved and other human rights, and the
relationship between such human rights and the common good.
Such knowledge may only be acquired if the contents of the human
rights are analyzed. Moreover, it is necessary to inquire about the
degree of public interest inherent to the norm under
consideration.15
In fact, the temporal sequence above described is not lineal.
There is a circle of comprehension that involves both the
15. The Argentine Supreme Court has said: “the degree of the public
interests affected and the principles to be protected will determine the degree of
the regulations in each case.” CSJN, 1/9/1944, “Pedro Inchauspe c. Junta
Nacional de Carnes” Fallos (1944-199-483) (Arg.). Such statement seems to be
extremist. In my opinion, the relationship between public interest and human
rights should not be a one-way road, but there should be a reciprocal influence.
Just as the degree of public interest affected cannot be indifferent, the human
right involved cannot be indifferent either.
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examination of the alteration and of the justification in a process of
mutual feedback (called by Engisch “hin-und herwandern des
blicks”). For this reason, the degree of importance given to the
norm in relation to the common good can influence on the
determination of the precise content of the human right involved in
the case. However, we can conclude, too, that examining the
alteration is the starting point and the key to proportionality stricto
sensu.16 The light shed by examining the alteration transmits its
clarity to the darkness of the exam of justification and thus, the
temptation of utilitarianism may be avoided.
Now a question arises: how should the examination of the
alteration be carried out? To determine if a measure alters a
human right or not, the inquiry about the essential content of such
right should be performed. Once the essential content has been
established, it is necessary to determine if the measure interferes
with it or not. Thus, the most important point is to identify which
is the inalterable content. This is a task to be performed by the
constitutional interpreter, especially by the judges with
constitutional competence. It will be done “in the light of the
constitutional norms, through a systematic and specific
interpretation of the Constitution, and through an understanding of
each human right in relation to its underlying moral values and
concepts, and to the objectives to be achieved through its
protection.”17

16. So much so, that without this test the principle of proportionality
becomes meaningless. If this step is omitted, it may lead to not applying the
principle at all, as Jiménez Campo did. According to him:
The evaluation of the law would not lose much, and it would even
achieve some certainty, if the principle of proportionality, as an
autonomous and direct canon, were less demanded and applied and,
maybe, even excluded. To assess the proportionality of a norm, maybe
legal or not, is, in short, just to compare, to balance or to weight “losses”
and “profits” which, from a juridical point of view, are not rationally
measurable and they leave narrow margin to the argumentation and
counter argumentation according to objective criteria.
Javier Jiménez Campo, Artículo 53. Protección de los derechos fundamentales,
in COMENTARIOS A LA CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA DE 1978, t. IV, at 438, 488
(Oscar Alzaga Villaamil ed., 1996).
17. MARTÍNEZ PUJALTE, supra note 1, at 73.
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In my opinion, the decisive point will be to make a teleological
inquiry of the human rights involved,18 especially taking into
account the goods whose protection is looked for through their
constitutional recognition,19 and without forgetting about the
significant role played by the facts of the case,20 in the manner in
which it has been stated by the Spanish Constitutional Court.21

18. See 1 RAFAEL BIELSA, La locución justo y razonable en el derecho y en
jurisprudencia, in ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO PÚBLICO: DERECHO
ADMINISTRATIVO (1950).
19. Pedro Serna Bermúdez, Derechos fundamentales: el mito de los
conflictos, 4 HUMANA IURA 197, 225 (1994); MARTÍNEZ PUJALTE, supra note 1,
at 72.
From another viewpoint, “the principle of proportionality stricto sensu must
be understood as a formal principle from which no material content for judicial
review is derived.” GAVARA DE CARA, supra note 1, at 319-320. According to
A. Boggiano, “to judge about the reasonableness of the positive law is to judge
about the fundamentals of the positive law in the natural law.” ANTONIO
BOGGIANO, POR QUÉ UNA TEORÍA DEL DERECHO: INTRODUCCIÓN A UN DERECHO
CONSTITUCIONAL 42 (1992).
20. See Guy Braibant, Le principe de la proportionnalité, in MÉLANGES
OFFERTS À MARCEL WALINE 297, 306 (1974).
21. See S.T.S., Jan. 18, 1991 (R.T.C. 1991-I-195, FJ 2) (Spain), in which
the Constitutional Court stated: “the Constitution includes a value system which
respects the demand of a teleological interpretation of the Constitution.” See
also S.T.S., Apr. 8, 1981 (R.T.C.1981-173, FJ 10) (Spain); S.T.S., Feb. 17, 1984
(R.T.C. 1984-I-227, FFJJ 2, 5) (Spain). See MARTÍNEZ PUJALTE, supra note 1,
at 72.
la

